

CHAPTER TWO:
A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM NINE SITES

2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM NINE SITES

This summary emerges from a comparative analysis of the detailed and referenced evidence provided per site in Chapters 3-11. It is offered at the front of the document to facilitate rapid assimilation of the material. Some recommendations are included here and then those seeking a quick review of the data can proceed to reading the recommendations for institutionalising a model (Chapter 13). However, this was primarily a place-based study by a geographer and to achieve a nuanced understanding of the data requires a careful reading of the site chapters. Embracing this detail is likely to save on implementation costs by creating a greater awareness that both appropriate strategy and activities are usually site specific and dependent on such factors as available partnerships and the kinds of challenges found in each area.

General findings are presented below as succinct evidence-based answers to the questions given in the research objectives:

1. Can a CMP make an impact on crime levels?
2. Can a CMP make an impact on the environment?
3. Can a CMP improve interagency and interdepartmental cooperation?
4. Can a CMP improve community cooperation/involvement in crime prevention?
5. How does a CMP affect community perceptions of safety and the NPA?
6. What is the appropriate geographic unit for targeting?
7. What human resources are required?
8. What is the best office location?
9. What are the qualities of a good community prosecutor?
10. What is the appropriate rank for a community prosecutor?
11. Which are the appropriate CMP activities?
12. Is the term community prosecutions appropriate to South Africa?
13. How should community prosecutions be defined in South Africa?

14. Should there be different models for rural, peri-urban and urban areas?
15. How should a CMP structure delivery and strategic partnerships?
16. What partnerships are most important for a CMP locally?
17. How do other prosecutors and members of the NPA perceive a community prosecutor?
18. What material resources are needed for a CMP to be effective?
19. What kind of training is required for a CMP?
20. What are the general lessons for implementation? How should the model be institutionalised?

2.1 Can a CMP make an impact on crime levels?

The findings per site on crime impacts are detailed in Section 8 of Chapters 3-11 to cover this matter thoroughly. At Siyahlala, Mamelodi, Ngangelizwe, and Windsor, crime levels dropped between the time of the May 2006 baseline study and the evaluation and this was attributed by informants (in focus group discussions, questionnaires and interviews) to CMP-led partnership activities. Therefore these sites are highlighted further below.

The impact on reducing cattle rustling at Kudumane was well evident owing to extensive testimony but this mainly occurred before piloting and statistics were not available at the time of the evaluation study. Thus, it is best to see the detailed explanation offered in Chapter 9.

At both Bohlokong and Mdantsane, the crime statistics provided by SAPS and SAPS testimony do not suggest a drop in crime levels owing to CMP activities. Yet it was possible to identify many places on the landscape that were safer owing to CMP partnership activities (see Section 8 in each chapter and Section 2.2 below).

Regarding Point, it also appeared *highly likely* that the reduction in street children and the closure and better regulation of taverns *contributed* to the reduction in contact crimes that occurred during the piloting period. Furthermore, SAPS Crime Prevention Head van der

Westhuizen did testify to this correlation in interview.¹ However, there was a six month gap in delivery during the changeover of community prosecutors from SPP Sunil Prithipal to SPP Val Melis and old projects were dropped and new ones assumed making it too difficult to disaggregate the impact of so many different stakeholders and activities under these circumstances.

1. SIYAPHLALA:

For the first time in years, crime dropped in Siyahlala during the time of the pilot and this could be correlated to the activities of the CMP as follows:

- *A CMP-led raid on chop shop:* this not only closed down an illegal and polluting activity but seemingly stopped the car hijacking that was occurring at a rate of three to five a month before the raid.²
- *The ‘Bundu Courts’ were stopped.* In late 2006 alone about 13 people were murdered owing to high levels of vigilantism but police and residents at the time of the evaluation perceived that this activity had ceased altogether owing to CMP efforts to educate the community and improve police-community relations³ The murder rate plummeted to zero for most of the pilot (from November 2006) when vigilante committees were replaced by a CMP committee on crime prevention.
- *A drop in break-ins and thefts from shops (from several a month to none on business premises for an 8-month stretch)* The CMPs public education and awareness activities were identified on questionnaires and interviews as having had a *major* and positive impact on the relationship between the community and shop owners such that break ins and thefts from shops and homes had reached almost negligible figures.⁴ No crimes occurred on business premises for eight months and this was attributed directly to the CMP project.⁵

¹ Supt. Van der Westhuizen, SAPS Crime Prevention Head, Point, Interview, 15 August 2007

² The ‘chop shop’ reopened in Siyahlala in October 2007, two months after data collection for this study and this does provide certain evidence that raids and closures are not the best activity for a CMP (see Section 2.11 in this chapter)

³ Mncana, Inspector, SAPS Sector Manager, Survey and Round-Table Discussion, Nyanga, 06 June 2007.

⁴ Facilitated Survey and Discussion, Zolani Community Hall, Nyanga, 06 June 2007

⁵ Siyahlala Local Steering Committee, Minutes, Nyanga, 1 February 2007.

- *A statistical drop in domestic violence (from 8-11 a month to 2-3 a month):* this can be correlated in time with the CMPs circulation of an emergency list; a public education campaign and improved referrals.
- *A drop in burglary, break-ins, residential robbery (6-7 a month to 2-3 a month):* this correlates to the time of many CMP-led public information campaigns and improving relationships within the community.
- *A drop in robberies and assaults by about half:* these can be correlated to the regulation of liquor outlets and shebeens (especially closing earlier) based both on the period in question and testimony as to this impact⁶; Questionnaire respondents likewise identified a drop in crime (statistically confirmed) and attributed this to the closures and the self-regulation of shebeens promoted by the CMP.⁷

2. MAMELODI:

A drop in crime levels could be identified in these ways:

- *Assaults dropped by 60% between October 2006 and May 2007 (from 58 to 23).* Since most assaults had originated in the shebeens, the CMP effort to regulate them over this exact period is strongly correlated to the statistical decline and this matched widespread testimony from shebeen owners, police, and data from questionnaires which attributed the decline to the CMP's role in the regulation of shebeens. The shebeen owners also testified to this drop in crime (in interviews) and attributed it to the CMP project saying their businesses have become safer, patrons are safer, and the shebeens are now being managed more professionally.⁸
- *A 60-70% drop in housebreaking between October 2006 and April/May 2007:* This statistical decline also found corroboration in SAPS testimony⁹ and in testimony from the Councillor for Ward 16, Sara Kashani, who said in interview that the patrols were having an impact on reducing crime both in the shebeens and in terms of housebreaking.¹⁰ Scores of arrests were made by the SAPS Mamelodi East Task Team owing to reports by the night patrolling group that the CMP

⁶ McEvoy, Captain S. B., Informal Interview and Survey, Nyanga, 06 June 2007; Insepctor Mncana, Sector 3 Manager, Focus Group Discussion and Survey, Nyanga, 06 June 2007

⁷ Discussion and Facilitated Survey of Stakeholders, Zolani Centre, Nyanga, 06 June 2007; McEvoy, Capatin, SAPS Nyanga, Focus group with stakeholders, 06 June 2007

⁸ Magoro, Andronica (shebeen owner), Personal Communication, 12 June 2007; Motha, Gladys (shebeen owner, Personal Communication, 12 June 2007, Inspector Dikgale, Sector 6 SAPS manager, 12 June 2007.

⁹ Inspector Dikgale, Sector 6 SAPS manager, 12 June 2007.

¹⁰ Kashani, Sara, Telephonic Interview with the Councillor of Ward 16, 13 June 2007

empowered.¹¹ Since community patrols had stopped in Mamelodi and were resurrected through the leadership of the CMP, the NPA played a significant role.

3. NGANGELIZWE

Comparing May-December 2005 with the same eight months in 2006, contact crimes dropped from 466 reported cases to 366 (a 21% drop). This dropped most precipitously between August and October (2005 and 2006) when new hours and regulations for shebeens were put into place owing to CMP partnership building and educational activities. There had been a total of 209 contact crimes between August and October 2005 and these dropped by 59 cases (28% fewer) during the same months in 2006.¹² While there was no drop when comparing November 2005 and 2006, contact crimes were more than halved in December 2006 (53%).

4. WINDSOR

A statistical drop in crime levels could be identified for WINDSOR EAST by comparing a six month period (January to June 2006 VS January to June 2007). It reveals this:

- Common Assault: *dropped by 38%*
- Assault GBH: *dropped by 50%*
- Theft of motor vehicle: *down 35%*
- Business Burglary: *dropped by 50%*

CMP partnership activities could be strongly correlated with the lowering of both kinds of assaults owing to: (1) successful efforts to eliminate drug sales from the streets; (2) making it difficult for illegal immigrants to reside in the area by working with estate agents and Immigration officials; (3) shutting down illegal businesses, particularly King's Pub owing to prosecutions; and (4) the CMPs partnership effort to create more pro-active policing—this helped to greatly reduce the illegal street trade and loitering on

¹¹ Mncwabe, Ron, Community Prosecution Monthly Reports, March/April 2007.

¹² Ngangelizwe Police Station, SAPS Quarterly Crime Comparison, Contact Crimes August-October 2005/2006.

sidewalks. One critical aspect of this was the CMP partnership with the SAPS Sector Manger. This resulted in much more active patrolling. Informants said that this factor reduced drug pedalling on the street and contributed greatly to the drop in business burglary.

Often the impact on crime levels in the above examples could be correlated to either (1) good information campaigns by the CMPs aimed at either the public or service providers such as SAPS; or (2) advocacy. For instance, taverns are often places where crime concentrates and a CMP can make a significant impact by making information available about the law (note: this is not the same as working *with* shebeen owners). This resulted in self-regulation such as improved hours of operation (e.g., Siyahlala, Ngangelizwe, Mdantsane, Mamelodi). Police performance was also improved through educational activities on the law provided by the CMPs through workshops or mentoring (see Siyahlala, Point, and Windsor). Sometimes the CMP would simply negotiate with a government department for specific kinds of service delivery (directing them to the site) resulting in a crime prevention impact (e.g., tavern regulation by the Liquor Board in Ngangelizwe).

2.2 Can a CMP make an impact on crime prevention through environmental design?

Yes--this is well-substantiated with extensive evidence from seven sites and it is best to read the detailed evidence in the relevant chapters (3-11). Even at two sites where it is clear that general crime levels were not lowered owing to the project (Mdantsane and Bohlokong), there was a substantial lowering of crime problems within *particular* areas that were targeted by the CMPs for crime prevention through environmental design (e.g., see Sections 5.8.2 and 8.8.2). Furthermore, the change in environmental conditions between the time of the baseline study and the evaluation was dramatic in both Siyahlala and Windsor. The first looked much cleaner and safer owing to community patrolling, refuse removal, fewer loitering youth, a new crèche, and better community organisation. At Windsor, loitering was dramatically reduced (no more drug sellers on the street or

loitering youth) while many streets and neighbourhoods were much cleaner (less litter). SAPS patrolling was also much more active.

Another example to highlight is the Victoria Open Area in Mamelodi where the most serious crimes occurred at the time of the May 2006 baseline study including rapes, murders, hijackings, armed robberies, common robberies, cell phone thefts, and handbag thefts. The community prosecutor worked with the municipality to clear out the bush, remove garbage daily (there had been much illegal dumping), light the area and put in a soccer field. Crime figures dropped so dramatically (according to SAPS) that this once-dangerous area was no longer on SAPS list of hotspots and children now play there.¹³ The Councillor of Sector 6 (Ward 10 = Sector 6) also testified that the CMP project had been critical to this outcome.¹⁴

Since clear impact was made at seven of nine sites (major impact in terms of Siyahlala, Mamelodi, and Windsor), this is definitely a key performance area for any CMP. The exceptions are Phuthanang (no piloting took place) and Kudumane (the CMP tried to make impact in terms of improved cattle facilities but was unable to achieve the necessary partnerships).

2.3 Can a CMP improve interagency and interdepartmental cooperation?

Since partnership building is the chief manner in which the impacts on crime levels and environment were achieved (Sections 2.1 and 2.2), it is evident that a CMP can improve interagency and interdepartmental cooperation. This is also identified and discussed in greater detail in section 6 of the chapters on each site (3-11). Although the stakeholder questionnaire is best understood in the context of each site (see site chapters for clarity), it is also indicative that 82.5% of the 119 people from 8 sites (mostly professionals from various departments) who completed Question Five agreed that the community prosecutors helped to build greater levels of stakeholder cooperation. On Question Six,

¹³ Dikgale, Inspector, Personal Communication, Mamelodi, 12 June 2007

¹⁴ Mogaladi, Mokhine, Interview with Ward 10 Coucillor, Mamelodi East, 13 June 2007

92.5% agreed that the CMPs had helped individual government departments to perform better.

It appeared that the sites in urban areas were the most advantaged in terms of building partnerships owing to the proximity of stakeholders. For instance, businesses helped to finance crime prevention activities in the Point (e.g., Business Against Crime helped to purchase a morpho-touch machine for screening vagrants for criminal records prior to offering them skills training).

Peri-urban areas that are presidential sites and/or SAPS priority areas had no shortage of available partnerships but these CMPs were often disadvantaged in terms of attracting partners to attend meetings. This is because they had no budget for organising transport (distances are greater than in urban areas) and providing food when meeting to strategise and undertake joint activities (more details in the site chapters and in Chapter 13 on resources).

The most challenged site for creating stakeholder cooperation was the rural one. Most activities were based on cooperation between Kgomo Modimo Wa Gae (the anti-stock theft forum), the SAPS Provincial Stock Theft Unit and the NPA. According to stakeholders these limited partnerships owed to distances and poor cooperation between the community and the local police (some of the latter had been accused of stock theft—see Chapter 9 for details).

2.4 Can a CMP improve community cooperation/involvement in crime prevention?

Detailed evidence and explanation making use of questionnaires and other data is found in Section 8.4 of each chapter to make it very clear that the CMPs at all sites except Phuthanang improved community cooperation and involvement in crime prevention. No piloting occurred at Phuthanang for reasons discussed in that chapter and therefore there was no improvement at this one site that can be attributed to the NPA.

The best practice for building community cooperation around crime prevention appears to be identifying and further developing pre-existing community-based organisations that have such concerns (e.g., the CPF, the Windsor Action Group in Windsor, Kgomo Modimo Wa Gae at the rural site). At Siyahlala, the site was so small that there were no pre-existing groups and therefore the CMP created a community-based crime prevention body and while very effective, it replicated structures found at a wider scale and could encounter friction with these bodies over time. For instance, at Mamelodi, the CPF chair feared that the CMP was creating structures that would replace them and this appeared to undermine the CMP partnership forum until this was resolved. By contrast, the CMP at Mdantsane did not encounter any ‘territorial conflicts’ with pre-existing organisations on crime prevention because he worked with the existing ones and their programmes such that he was viewed as neither competitive nor contentious.¹⁵

These findings suggest that a CMP should identify (audit) and work with pre-existing organisations. Certainly the CMP can promote sub-forums of the CPF if this leads to improved community involvement in crime prevention (i.e., the CMP’s structures at Siyahlala could become sub-forums of the CPF). Second to this, the findings indicate that a CMP should facilitate community ownership of strategies to bring down crime rather than create NPA-ownership owing to sustainability issues (e.g., see Chapter 11).

2.5 How does a CMP affect community perceptions of safety and the NPA?

Improved feelings of community safety owing to the CMP were found to affect attitudes toward the NPA. For instance, one informant at Bohlokong said, “The Scorpions did not change my image of the NPA. This just seemed like the NPA was seeking attention but now I feel the change because they are working to make my community safer.”¹⁶ At many sites there were a few informants that did not know that the CMP was from the NPA and therefore this issue must be carefully addressed in terms of marketing the role.

¹⁵ Round-Table Discussion with Stakeholders, Mdantsane, 27 June 2007.

¹⁶ Round-Table Discussion with Stakeholders, Bohlokong, 24 July 2007.

Feelings of community safety were addressed on the questionnaire completed by CMP partners at each site. QUESTION 2 asked, 'Did the Community prosecutor help to change the environment at the target site to make it less conducive to crime?' and QUESTION 3 asked, 'Did the community prosecutor help to develop any crime prevention projects or programmes at the target site that will help to prevent crime on an ongoing basis?' These results are best explained in terms of each site (Sections 8.2 and 8.5 of each chapter 3-11). However, analysis of the results indicated that the community perceived these six pilot sites to be safer:

- SIYAHLALA: the community could identify and attribute to the CMP a large list of crime prevention impacts that the evaluator could also locate in the environment (owing to comparisons with baseline observations) and correlate to a statistical drop in crime at the pilot site.
- NU1 MDANTSANE: On stakeholder questionnaires, the CMP was associated with many environmental impacts that prevented crime at particular sites and these could also be observed and photographed even though these changes did not appear to make an impact on overall crime levels.
- BOHLOKONG: Certain places and areas are safer according to CMP partners and much of this was associated by informants with the activities of the CMP (although he did not lower overall crime levels).
- WINDSOR: A substantial impact on the environment could be observed and photographed and this impact was attributed to the activities of the CMP on partnership questionnaires while crime statistics also indicated a drop in crime levels.
- POINT: A definite and substantial impact was made on the environment as indicated by questionnaire respondents and corroborated in terms of observations by the evaluator (although it cannot be clearly correlated with a drop in crime levels and may have involved some displacement).
- KUDUMANE: Research participants and interviewees perceived that stock theft had dropped dramatically and this was attributed to the CMP on questionnaires and in round-table discussion with stakeholders but the relevant crime statistics were not made available to the evaluator (this CMP was engaged in crime prevention activities at the site from November 2004, more than a year before the pilot project was initiated in April 2006).

At two sites (Mamelodi and Ngangelizwe) the communities did not seem to hold the *perception* that the overall environment was safer although statistically these were safer. The two CMPs *also* held doubts that these environments could be described as safer owing to the enormity of the task (very high crime rates to start) and the limited time for piloting. On the other hand, two sites that were not statistically safer were *perceived* to be safer by partners and residents owing to the work of the CMPs (Bohlokong and Mdantsane). At Phuthanang, there was no piloting at the site and therefore improved feeling of safety could not be attributed to the NPA.

2.6 What is the appropriate geographic unit for a CMP to address?

A key finding of this report is that it is better strategy to focus on entire SAPS priority areas than sectors of them. A table is provided immediately below in which the original pilot sites are listed in the left-hand side and the recommended pilot sites are listed on the right-hand side:

FIGURE ONE:
THE ORIGINAL PILOT SITES AND RECOMMENDED TARGET SITES

	ORIGINAL PILOT SITE	RECOMMENDED AREA
1	<u>Siyahlala</u> (<i>less than one SAPS sector</i>)	<i>Three SAPS stations that form part of the priority zone: Nyanga, Philippi East, Philippi West</i>
2	<u>Mamelodi</u> (<i>3 SAPS sectors</i>)	<i>The six sectors of the Mamelodi East SAPS station</i>
3	<u>NU1 Mdantsane</u> (<i>one SAPS sector</i>)	<i>All three SAPS stations: Mdantsane, Vulindlela and Inyibiba</i>
4	<u>Ngangelizwe</u> (<i>a place-based identity rooted in history that falls across three SAPS Sectors</i>)	<i>A strategic approach to the whole station area but with a focus on the three high crime sectors of Ngangelizwe SAPS (rather than a historic area) to enable measurement of impact</i>
5	<u>Phuthanang</u> (<i>only part of Sector A of the Galeshewe SAPS Station</i>)	<i>Galeshewe (5 Sectors, two police stations)</i>
6	<u>Bohlokong</u> (<i>half of a policing area</i>)	<i>One SAPS policing area with two stations: all of Bohlokong (10 sectors) and Bethlehem (11 sectors)</i>

(Figure One continued on next page)

FIGURE ONE (CONTINUED):
THE ORIGINAL PILOT SITES AND RECOMMENDED TARGET SITES

	ORIGINAL PILOT SITE	RECOMMENDED AREA
7	Ga-Morona Village (<i>this original pilot site was only 4 sq km and expanded out of necessity during piloting to include 156 villages</i>)	7 SAPS policing areas: Bothitong, Mothibistad, Batlharos, Tsineng, Heinengsvlei, Morokwene, Ganyesa
8	Windsor East (<i>this one-sq km area expanded to 4 sq km during piloting</i>)	A cross-border area of Linden and Randburg SAPS sectors (owing to displacement and the particular crime being addressed)
9	Point (5 sectors)	Point SAPS and the adjacent sector of Durban Central (the continuous beachfront zone)

The reasons for targeting whole station areas are explained in detail in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 in Chapters 3-11. Summarised below are the six main reasons for this finding (five were identified in round-table discussions at each site and analysis produced the last-mentioned factor):

A. Popular demand by stakeholders

First, all of those completing stakeholder questionnaires and participating in round-table discussion at seven out of nine sites (and almost half of those at Siyahlala) agreed that *entire SAPS priority zones* or at least whole station areas within them (as opposed to policing sectors within station areas) were more appropriate units to target for community prosecutions (for all the reasons further itemised below). Secondly, three sites expanded out of necessity during piloting to target wider areas including: Siyahlala (to satisfy the demands of local stakeholders and crime displacement); Kudumane (to address the full extent of the cattle rustling problem); and Windsor (to address the displacement of crime).

B. Stability for the CMP post

Targeting individual policing sectors can make the CMP dependent on one SAPS commander while targeting an entire SAPS priority zone (sometimes consisting of

more than one station area) allows for a wider range of interaction and avoids over-dependency on individual SAPS management and personalities. For good examples of this described problem see the chapters on Mdantsane and Mamelodi. At Mdantsane, many projects stopped or slowed when a cooperative station commissioner was replaced by a less cooperative one while at Mamelodi programmes could not get underway until the CMP moved to a new station altogether.

C. To facilitate appropriate partnerships

First, SAPS priority sites, presidential sites and development nodes often include more than one station and this presents many additional partnering possibilities. Secondly, the chief and critical partner, SAPS, does not design crime-prevention strategies or profiles that address only one sector. Rather, sectors are the divisions for *administering* the station's programmes across the entire policing area. For example, the imbizos for crime awareness go to all the sectors but simply take place on different days in different sectors. Third, since CPFs strategically address an entire policing area, it was difficult for them to partner with CMPs that only worked in one sector (e.g., NU1 Mdantsane). Fourth, an important reason for appropriate partnering is to avoid a duplication of efforts. Structures and partners are often found at wider scales that are not in evidence at a small scale (e.g., crèche programmes exist for all of Ward 80 but not Siyahhlala).

D. To address the appropriate range of any particular crime problem

Rather than attempting to solve all crime problems in one or two SAPS sectors, it makes more sense to: (1) identify the crime prevention problems within an entire policing area; (2) negotiate priorities for prevention; and then (3) address each crime problem in accordance with the sectors involved. This would allow the CMP to: develop programmes to fit the range of any particular crime problem that might be addressed; participate and learn from station strategies that might go to

adjacent sectors; and address the problem of crime displacement by taking a more holistic view of an area.

E. To enable the appropriate monitoring and measurement of impact

First, crime statistics are monitored and measured in terms of an entire policing area and not sectors. Some CMPs found it very difficult to deliver statistics for this report owing to this. For instance, Ngangelizwe and Phuthanang (two of the selected pilot sites listed above) are descriptive and historic areas that fall *within* a SAPS-defined high crime areas but do not correspond to the SAPS sectors or any other form of administrative boundary. This kind of target site made it difficult to identify and measure of impact and therefore is not recommended. Secondly, crime is easily displaced from one area to the next making it difficult to identify impact by examining one sector alone (e.g., see the chapter on Windsor).

F. To make the best use of limited resources

Given limited resources in terms of personnel (South Africa will not have several CMPs per municipality as in the US), it is appropriate and practical to focus on those SAPS areas nationally that produce the most crime: 40% of the murders, attempted murders, rapes and assault GBH occur in 8.6%, 7.5%, 10.4%, and in 11.4% of precincts respectively.¹⁷ Furthermore, this was one of the reasons that the NPA site selection committee chose SAPS High Priority areas (nationally and provincially)—it is only being recommended that the scale of activities be larger for the reasons given and to help make measurable impact on these priority areas in partnership with other stakeholders.

Why was there a difference of opinion on the appropriate target area at two sites (Siyahlala and Ngangelizwe)? First, at Ngangelizwe, the majority recommended a site composed of only two to three SAPS sectors out of the five belonging to the station because: (1) crime concentrates in these sectors; and (2) very little piloting was undertaken at this site. Furthermore, SPP Busakwe was restrained in terms of available

¹⁷ National Department of Safety and Security, National Serious Crime Figures 2006/2007, June 2007

time (@10%) and owing to this stakeholders warned that the credibility of the NPA would be affected if Ngangelizwe were not further addressed. A focus on two to three sectors of Ngangelizwe is not in conflict with the basic finding that a CMP should take an entire policing area into account when developing strategy. In this case, crime concentrates in Ngangelizwe, and a lowering of the crime statistics for the entire station area can be achieved through such a focus. However, impact must be measurable and therefore SAPS sectors must be the focus and not a historical area.

Secondly, at Siyahlala a debate arose. All agreed that the pilot site was too small but the respondents were split three ways on how to reorganise it: (1) by wards including two policing areas; (2) the area of Brown's Farm; and (3) the SAPS national priority area of Nyanga that includes three contiguous police station areas. Very few suggested Brown's Farm and the third suggestion, which was strongly argued by SAPS members and others, fits with the findings from seven other sites where this viewpoint was unanimous. Upon analysis, the suggestion of the NPA targeting ward areas also appeared problematic since:

- This could associate community prosecutions with political divisions when the post should be associated chiefly with improved service delivery and inter-departmental partnerships aimed at driving down crime and reducing the court roll.
- A ward councillor might be corrupt, creating a potentially bad association for the NPA (e.g., see the chapter on Mamelodi)
- The chief partners for the NPA on this from a national level should be SAPS and Justice

Owing to all of the above, it is recommended that:

- A CMP be assigned *first* to an entire SAPS high priority area: the work of the NPA should be in support of (and viewed as) bringing down crime in an entire SAPS priority area.
- Then, identification of the crimes to be targeted by the CMP can be developed in discussions between the NPA, SAPS and the relevant stakeholders at each site (e.g., Community members, SAPS, CPF).

- Finally, each particular crime problem within a SAPS priority area that become the CMP priorities should inform the sectors on which he/she might focus (e.g., housebreaking might involve a different set of sectors than assaults)

2.7 What human resources are needed for the recommended target areas?

Eight out of nine CMPs considered that they could manage the recommended target areas with one to two additional CMPs in a rank between C5 and D2. CMP Melis at Point was the exception as she was happy to work with the existing court prosecutors available to her (two) due to limited office space.

Owing to the large target areas being recommended (whole station areas) and the need to create a sustained system of community prosecutions (what if a trained CMP leaves the organisation?), the human resources recommended by the evaluator for addressing each of these areas would be one experienced CMP supervising two trainees (C5-D2 level). However, if the NPA argues that there are insufficient human and material resources to address the proposed target area, it is not recommended to change focus from lowering crime in a SAPS high priority area. Rather:

- One CMP can develop a strategic plan for the entire area but disaggregate the crime problems and concentrate on one or two particular crimes in terms of the sectors where that crime concentrates.
- Where there are community courts, the court prosecutors can help the CMP to deliver reducing the demand for more CMPs (e.g., this was the situation at Point where the CMP said there was no space for more trainees at the station).
- Where there are SOCA units (4 sites), these personnel can also assist

Eight out of nine CMPs (88%) desired an administrative assistant to manage the diary, file documents, type letters, arrange appointments, help with event management and answer the phone. CMP Val Melis was again the exception and this related mainly to: (1) her particular administrative assistant, which she did not deem to be helpful; and (2) sharing limited office space which allowed her no privacy for meetings on sensitive matters. However, those CMPs that did not have an administrative assistant struggled to

manage all tasks (e.g., see the chapter on Mdantsane where CMP Mampofu was full time on the job at a Presidential site but had no office assistance).

2.8 What is the best office location?

An appealing office location that was *not* part of the piloting situation was discussed at some sites (e.g., the Mdantsane participants in round-table discussion): a multi-purpose centre or ‘one-stop centre.’¹⁸ These cluster different kinds of government and non-government role-players together in one place and one is already being planned for Mdantsane. However, since there was no example of this in the study, the *best* office location for a CMP (based on the available data) appeared to be an office alongside a community court *at* a SAPS station for these reasons (as offered in interviews):

- SAPS offers partnership access: more and more SAPS stations are acting as one-stop centers
- SAPS offers safety: the office at the Point SAPS station was not even affected by protest when the regular courts were shut down; the isolated community court in Gugulethu was firebombed and had to be rebuilt
- Community court offers some independence: not fully dependent on SAPS; reduces the likelihood that the NPA would be charged by other departments and stakeholders as entering into the arena of community activism—instead the CMP is associated with reducing crime backlogs and alleviating pressure on the courts.
- Community court offers immediate recognition: no confusion--this person is associated with the NPA
- Community court offers clout: It offers the CMP the capacity to fast-track cases; conduct criminal proceedings that send a message to potential perpetrators and offer alternative sentencing options
- Community court offers human resources: this avails the CMP of additional prosecutors who can participate in outreach and yet they do not have to be senior prosecutors

A community court (not at a SAPS station) appeared to be the next best option since it fit with all those reasons bulleted except the last one. Presumably there are other ways to

¹⁸Facilitated Survey and Workshop Discussion, Mdantsane, 27 June 2007.

ensure safety. However, the new community court at Fazeka was re-opened the week of October 14, 2007 in temporary buildings without much security infrastructure.

It is NOT accurate to say that a CMP should *only* go where there is a community court.

After all:

- Seven community prosecutors without a court made *significant* impact on preventing crime (either statistically and/or through environmental change).
- The rural CMP did not believe that such a court would be functional in a deep rural area like Kudumane owing to distance (the CMP needs to be mobile and go *to* the stakeholders).
- Other options might arise that were not part of the piloting situation (e.g., community justice centres are being mooted in some areas)

The third best option after the two described community court situations appeared to be at a SAPS station *without a community court* but in a mobile unit to distinguish the NPA role. The problem with being at a SAPS station without a mobile unit (the fourth option) is a confusion of roles by the public. Mobile units parked at police stations also provide the additional advantage that they can be moved to other sites in the future.

The fifth choice is an office in a Magistrate's Court (if nearby the target area). It is the last choice because on examination it appeared to promote a situation where both seniors and colleagues involve the CMP in daily court matters, reducing the time available for community prosecutions. For instance:

- There was such pressure on two successive CMPs at Galeshewe that neither of them ever piloted *in* the targeted community (neither Heunis nor Mabogoane).
- At Ngangelizwe the CMP had only 10% of his time available for piloting because he was under pressure from court duties.

Furthermore, an office in the regular courts frequently places the CMP out of reach of the community as evidenced on surveys and in focus group discussion with CMP partners at both Windsor and Ngangelizwe.¹⁹

In the United States aside from being located at *municipal* police stations, many community prosecutors are in commercial areas or at municipal offices but these last two locations were deemed undesirable by the South African informants for this study including all nine CMPs. The reason: the landscape of South Africa is still much politicised and the pilot areas are often unsafe (e.g., the community court in Nyanga was fire-bombed). Municipal administration buildings were also seen as affiliated with political parties.

2.9 What are the qualities of a good community prosecutor?

The character traits of each CMP and suitability to the role were defined and discussed in the third section of every chapter but the chapter on Point is the most revealing on this issue because there was a change in CMPs that could be analysed. The traits required of a community prosecutor might be summarised as someone willing and able to:

- Facilitate *community ownership* of crime prevention activities (not NPA or CMP ownership)
- Work closely with community-based structures
- Be highly visible to community members
- Understand community-based crime problems *from* the perspective of community members (or be *compassionate*—see the chapters on Point or Mdantsane)
- Prioritise and analyse community needs
- Liaise with appropriate government departments so as to achieve a better integration and fit between community-defined needs and service delivery

¹⁹ Stakeholder Questionnaires and Round-Table Discussion with CMP Partners at SAPS Ngangelizwe, 04 July 2007; See Section 10.4.1 regarding Windsor.

This last bulleted item describes a liaison role situated between the community and the service providers found at government and organisational levels. This then plays a role in the definition of a community prosecutor (further below).

Interviews, group discussions and an analysis of the data also suggested that these are some of the other traits appropriate to role:

- Flexible in terms of hours (many meetings are in the evenings and on weekends)
- Strategic-minded (must be able to understand and develop both long and short-term crime prevention strategies and not get too involved in casework)
- Experienced in community outreach and mediation
- Good interpersonal skills
- Language skills appropriate to the targeted area
- Experienced in taking on new challenges
- A passion for community service (inappropriate: those focused only on personal ambition or achievement)
- Able to partner easily with people ranging from those of very low socioeconomic levels to ministers and business investors

2.10 What is the appropriate rank for a community prosecutor?

That a D1 made considerable progress at one site (Bohlokong) suggests that the *character* of the individual is one of the most important aspects of the post, exceeding even rank in importance. However, all NPA informants for this report believed that at least a senior prosecutor is needed to supervise the position since that individual can lead others and cooperate closely with senior members of different departments. If two or three prosecutors are assigned to an area, only one would need to hold a D3 position and the remainder might be anyone from a C5 to a D2 that had the above-described characteristics.

2.11 What are the most appropriate activities for a CMP?

Bulleted and discussed below are the main activities from the eight active sites divided into two lists—(a) those that appeared on analysis to be appropriate; and (b) those that appeared on analysis to be less appropriate. The reasons for inclusion in either category are given within these two lists and then a summary explanation follows.

A. Activities that appeared to be appropriate

- **STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BUILDING FOR LOCAL CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES:** This is the necessary and quintessential activity in which all the CMPs engaged--the CMPs learned about crime problems from community members in various ways (discussions, mapping exercises, CPF attendance, observing the landscape) and then facilitated partnerships, usually with the relevant service provider(s), to reduce the problem. Sometimes impacts were immediate (e.g., Public Works condemns an abandoned building, Parks and Recreation clears of an overgrown field where criminals hide, Immigration removes illegal immigrants--see the chapters on Mamelodi or Windsor for good examples of this impact). Sometimes it results in an ongoing partnership programme (e.g., see Operation Hope in Chapter 11 on the Point).
- **PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS ON THE LAW:** This appeared as a much needed activity at all sites because often there was dim awareness of the law. For example, educating the community about the law in Siyahlala helped bring an end to vigilantism and there are indications that it reduced levels of domestic violence. This kind of activity comes with a proviso: these campaigns must be strategic (well thought-out) and aimed at a DEFINED target site, continuous at that site, and reach all segments of the population in multiple ways (e.g., school-aged youth, men, women, children, pensioners, unemployed...). The many activities can range from simple ones like drawing up an emergency list and distributing it to community outreach events involving public speakers (See Siyahlala for the best explanation, Section 3.7.1).
- **EDUCATION IN THE LAW FOR TARGETED GROUPS INCLUDING GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS:** The CMP can also identify the source of crime problems and then educate service providers, NGOs, neighbourhood watches, families, government departments, restaurants, street-sellers, business groups, farmers, and even shebeen owners about the laws relevant to crime prevention (all these groups appear to perform better if they are aware of the law). For example, there is much evidence that shebeen

owners became more self-regulating owing to education campaigns at several sites (e.g., Siyahlala, Mamelodi, Mdantsane and Ngangelizwe) and that this lowered crime levels (both generally in the area and in and around the shebeens in other cases). This is to be *strongly differentiated* from engagement in SAPS operations, which is not recommended.

- **IMPROVING SAPS PERFORMANCE AND FAST-TRACKING CASES:** The CMP can examine SAPS operations from the perspective of the law and then train members in issues such as the collection of evidence or how to improve docket quality for successful prosecutions. This procedure also helps to: fast-track cases, improve the conviction rate and follow-up on cases. For instance, police members testified during round-table discussion at Siyahlala that fewer dockets were disappearing *and* fewer cases were being thrown since dockets were being strengthened by the CMP to result in convictions.²⁰
- **SELECTIVE PROSECUTIONS AND DIVERTING CASES:** The CMPs at Ngangelizwe, Windsor, Bohlokong, and Siyahlala made good use of selective prosecutions to send a public message that crime does not pay. CMP Busakwe prosecuted a corrupt police officer. CMP Mathenjwa shut down an unlicensed pub that was attracting drugs sales, criminality and creating a public nuisance. The evaluator observed documentation on three court cases that *originated with* CMP Motaung (Bohlokong) after reports were made to him by the community. This resulted in convictions. CMP Fiona Cloete helped shut down an unlicensed shebeen and the other shebeens quickly started to self-regulate their operations. The CMP at Bohlokong *also* helped to divert cases away from the court that could be resolved through mediation (easing court congestion).
- **ADVOCATING IMPROVED LAWS:** A CMP is in an excellent position to observe laws that are working or not working (on the ground) such as the Stock Theft Act (see Section 9.7.4 in the chapter on Kudumane) or laws concerning street children (see Section 11.6.4). The advocacy campaign by CMP Matolong to alter various sections of the Stock Theft Act could make a difference *nationally* in terms of lowering the rate of stock theft. Interestingly, it was his experience as a CMP that led to a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the Stock Theft Act and its failings such that he could suggest amendments to the law.

²⁰ Van Rensburg, D. Commander, Metro Police, et al, Round-table Discussion, Zolani Centre, Nyanga, 06 June 2007

B. Activities that appeared to be less appropriate

- **SETTING UP NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCHES:** A CMP can strengthen these through training (see Education in the Law above) but responsibility for establishing these belongs to other organisations like departments of community safety. Furthermore, a CMP can accomplish much more by analysing community crime problems and advocating appropriate responses or engaging in public education and awareness.
- **ONE TIME PUBLIC INFORMATION DAYS:** It is critical to understand that public information campaigns must be based on a long-term strategic plan and structured to involve a large number of different kinds of events targeted at every population group and agents of service delivery *at a defined target site* and in a constant manner. A ‘once-off’ public outreach activity for one particular sector of the population would have NO impact.
- **GENERAL OUTREACH CAMPAIGNS THAT ARE *NOT* GEOGRAPHICALLY TARGETED:** A public outreach campaign on all kinds of crime problems that travels all over the province and is not targeted and focused at a particular site or crime problem (e.g., see the chapter on Phuthanang) will have limited impact. Crime is a very complex social problem and concentrating on carefully selected problems in one defined area with all available resources and partnerships while monitoring and evaluating to improve delivery is usually required to make *any* impact.
- **LEGALISING SHEBEENS AND CLOSING OTHERS DOWN (OPERATIONS):** It appears far better for a CMP to advocate improved service delivery by the Liquor Board and other relevant departments. This is to be carefully differentiated from engaging in Public Information Campaigns on the law—in partnership with the Liquor Board, SAPS, or Licensing. A CMP can offer shebeen owners information *about* the law. This last activity is different than operations to shut down shebeens and can help to reduce crime levels based on the experiences in Siyahlala, Mamelodi and Mdantsane. On the other hand, a series of operations on taverns launched by SAPS, the CPF, and the MEC for Safety and Security in Bohlokong on October 20, 2006 resulted in regression for CMP Motaung because it took place just as the Tavern Forum was working well. The tavern owners then complained to the CMP that he was ‘backstabbing’ them.
- **ENGAGEMENT *IN* SAPS OPERATIONS:** Improving SAPS performance through advice and educational activities (that may make an impact on operations) is recommended but not participating in operations. This can endanger the health and well-being of the CMP who needs to be in the public eye and working closely with the community (and not identified as a threat to them). Besides, it is neither crime prevention nor effective in

that regard since it usually leads to the short term displacement of crime (see the chapters on Point and Windsor).

- **FOOD PRODUCTION, GARDENS, FEEDING SCHEMES AND FOOD DISTRIBUTION:** The CMP should rather advocate delivery by the appropriate government departments (Health, Social Development, etc), agencies and NGOs as it consumes too much time and is not sustainable by the NPA
- **PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:** Developing tourism, job programmes or economic opportunities are all complex, time-consuming undertakings that require a special background other than legal training and are already the major focus of municipalities, Trade and Industry and many other stakeholders. The CMP should rather advocate delivery by the appropriate government departments and/or refer to them as this is a professional task that consumes much time and is neither sustainable by the NPA nor suitable to the organisation.
- **SPEARHEADING EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMMES FOR YOUTH IN OR OUT OF SCHOOL:** This is professional task and a CMP can rather advocate service delivery by the appropriate departments, NGOs and agencies. A huge number of agencies are already engaged in this and it is best to link the schools to these groups. This DOES NOT mean that a CMP should refuse to participate in *their* programmes or to visit schools to teach about the law (see the above described public information campaigns).
- **INDIVIDUAL CASEWORK:** Some CMPs became involved in casework (e.g., helping an individual with access to food parcels, welfare grants or sorting out problems of domestic violence). This appears inappropriate simply because the CMP can accomplish much more through public information, advocacy and partnership building. The exception might be prosecuting a particular case through the courts that allows the CMP to make a strong public statement that the NPA will prosecute offenders (e.g., see Section 8.7.6—Bohlokong).

Upon analysis of the above and especially with consideration for the biggest crime prevention impacts per site (see each site chapter for details) nearly all of the activities deemed to be *appropriate* can be simplified as three main activities:

- ***Building strategic partnerships for crime prevention outcomes:*** working between community representatives (e.g., a community policing forum or a constituted body) to identify crime problems and then with those at departmental level who can help to prevent these problems (e.g. Parks and Recreation can clear an overgrown field where crime is occurring).

- ***Education and capacity-building in the law:*** for the public, government departments, or organisations to result in more law-abiding behaviour or improved delivery
- ***Selective cases for prosecution:*** to send a message to the community that crime does not pay

First, building strategic partnerships for crime prevention usually entails a strategic analysis of the site (e.g., a community mapping of crime problems as occurred at Mamelodi). Then, a CMP can engage the partners appropriate to resolving the problem. For example, CMP Motaung (Bohlokong) learned from the community about an area where robbery was occurring regularly and then negotiated this matter with the police such that SAPS targeted this area, slowing the rate of robbery at that site. In other words, he learnt about crime problems from members of the targeted community and *then* worked with SAPS to identify an appropriate response. At Phuthanang the project started by engaging big forums of stakeholders rather than with site-based discussions and mapping of crime problems and this appears inappropriate. In evidence, CMP Mabogoane had never been to the site at the time of the evaluation study.

Secondly, education and capacity building in the law for both government departments and community members has a critical role to play in explaining: (1) the law to community members; (2) what services are available for preventing or addressing crime (including community prosecutions); and (3) how to access these services. It can also have a strong crime prevention impact. In both Siyahlala and Kudumane, it changed vigilante organisations into law-abiding groups—the first group became a crime prevention committee working with SAPS and the second one is now a law-abiding membership organisation to prevent cattle theft that is rapidly spreading across the northern territories of the country. This activity should not be confused with general outreach as occurred at Phuthanang. A community prosecutor engaging in outreach must focus *continuously* on the target site to be effective (see the chapter of Siyahlala for a good explanation).

CMP effectiveness increased when *combining* site-specific capacity-building activities with partnership-building to generate pro-active responses to community-identified crime problems. For instance, CMP Melis helped to capacitate SAPS, Metro Police, Health and the CPF by informing them about Child Care Act. The aim of this was to both capacitate partners and to help coordinate better service delivery. It helped the participants to understand how to respond more appropriately and cooperatively when dealing with unsupervised youth in the streets. A child or youth properly treated by police and then referred to Health or another department for support is less likely to turn to criminality (a crime prevention impact) than one who is abused, mishandled or not referred at all (this perpetuates the cycle of violence).

Third, selecting certain cases to prosecute in court can also send a message to the community: the NPA aims to convict. A warning in the form of successful convictions is a strong one and can be a clear deterrent (a crime prevention impact). These activities also raise the profile of the CMP and build trust in the NPA. Of course, the *selection* of cases is a critical factor. It must send a public message. Otherwise too much casework returns the CMP to the courts reducing the time available for the activities that *together* with selective prosecutions create a large crime prevention impact.

Overall, it is creating a *balance* between these three described sets of activities that achieves impact. In other words, building strategic partnerships for crime prevention activities, building capacity through educational activities (including public information campaigns and an education in the law for government departments), and some selective prosecutions seems to create maximum impact. This *combination* appeared to be the strength and core of community prosecutions at the eight active sites. For example:

- In Windsor: CMP Mathenjwa worked with SAPS to build the capacity for more active patrolling; Immigration, Estate Agents, and Business to remove illegal immigrants; and used selective prosecutions (e.g., closing King's Tavern) to create a visible and measurable crime prevention impact.

- In Siyahlala: CMP Cloete engaged in public information campaigns with many different segments of the community; combined selective prosecutions with the education of shebeen owners, and built strategic partnerships for a crime prevention impact (especially, SAPS and the community) that was measurable in terms of lower crime levels.
- Otherwise, based on the analysis of this report, it was precisely these three described activities that contributed to a lowering of overall crime levels at four sites, reduced cattle-theft at the rural site and reduced crime in specific areas of the other three sites (see Section 2.1)

In further analysis it seems that:

- These three described activities (strategic partnering for crime prevention, education and capacity building in the law, and selective cases for prosecution) were most fitting to those trained in the law;
- Much can be accomplished over a wide area when a CMP engages these three activities in a balanced way as opposed becoming involved in too much individual casework (e.g., see Mdantsane)
- Training in the law is much needed country-wide since ignorance of the law appeared to account for major crime problems at these sites (e.g., shebeen owners at Mdantsane, Ngangelizwe, Siyahlala and Mamelodi quickly changed their operations to become more law-abiding when they learnt about the law from CMPs)
- A representative from the NPA appears to be in a good position to help build partnerships between community members and various departments for a crime prevention impact (e.g., the inability of community members to access justice in Siyahlala and for the police to identify community members for partnerships led to vigilantism in Siyahlala, which was stopped altogether once the CMP facilitated appropriate partnerships—see Chapter 3)

Interestingly, informants at all sites had a commonsense perception of the CMP role as one tied to selective prosecutions, improving dockets, building partnerships to prevent crime (decongesting the courts) and public information on the law. Addressing these common and obvious expectations of the role might also ensure that CMP activities are publicly accepted without much question. Otherwise, it might become necessary to explain and re-explain why a community prosecutor is involved in activities outside of the expected role (development issues, health issues, food programmes, etc).

2.12 Does the term ‘community prosecutor’ fit South African circumstances?

In group discussion at all nine pilot sites, respondents stated emphatically that they first responded to the term ‘community prosecutions’ as if a prosecutor was seeking to prosecute them---community members! It seems that the title of the post should communicate the concept in a more immediate, friendly and clear manner without too great of a departure from the original idea. For instance, consider *community advocates*, *community liaison prosecutors*, *public outreach prosecutors*, or *public liaison prosecutors*.

Additional evidence that the term ‘community prosecutions’ was somewhat problematic (and that a slight variation in terminology should be considered) included these:

- There appears to be a strategic need in South Africa to address areas much broader than a community (e.g. SAPS high priority areas).
- Decisions taken on community prosecutions in South Africa will be *national* ones (e.g., in United States, CMPs are municipal or district-level employees) and this allows for strategic implementation.
- On certain issues, like stock theft, a CMP *can* engage in a public outreach programme to cover a very wide area to good effect—the rural CMP seeks to work with as many as 7 SAPS stations, two Magisterial Districts, 11 wards, and 156 communities to address the problem of cattle rustling properly.
- There is so much crime displacement in South Africa that strategic analysis of the entire SAPS priority area and cooperation with partners at that scale appears like a better strategy than a limited geographic focus on a specific community.
- At seven out of nine sites the CMP partners *unanimously* recommended that the NPA consider working with two or more police stations involving many communities.
- The American image of a prosecutor immediately accessible in a community environment like a shopping centre or municipal hall does not seem to fit the situation in South Africa (most will be located at courts or police stations in South Africa)

2.13 How should ‘community prosecution’ be defined in South Africa?

Based on a comparative analysis of the definitions and activities of each CMP, this appears to be a good definition:

An appointed member of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) working with concerned stakeholders found throughout a high priority area for crime (as defined by the South African Police Service) to identify the *causal factors* producing the high crime rates and then helping to reduce the pressure on the courts by preventing these crimes from occurring through various activities including: the selective prosecution and fast-tracking of cases; public education in the law; educational and partnership activities with government departments that can improve service delivery; or otherwise facilitating partnerships between those concerned with crime at community level and various government departments and service providers.

This definition fits with all the research findings on appropriate activities and suggests the percentage of time that a CMP might allocate to activities in overview of the eight active CMPs:

- @45% of the time of the CMP might be involved in direct community engagement to identify crime problems and to organise the community to deal with them
- @45% of the time the CMP might be engaged in stakeholder coordination (formal and ad hoc meetings) to help address the problems identified above
- @10% might be expended on reports, planning events and preparing court cases

This describes someone directly involved with community members in trying to produce greater levels of safety within a SAPS-defined high priority area for crime by identifying and resolving problems. This could involve coordinating appropriate partnerships or simply supplying information on the law (to either the public or government departments) that can assist and empower them.

This definition also reveals that:

- Building a community profile is very important to the job because it develops trust

- A CMP should weight time expenditures toward social crime prevention efforts and limit the time involved with SAPS operations (other than to strengthen SAPS capacity--perhaps in terms of collecting evidence)
- A CMP should *not* take ownership of the crime prevention agenda but empower the community to take ownership of it by capacitating existing structures like the CPF or otherwise empower member of government departments in the law so as to assist with improved performance
- The most important time expenditure should be on building stronger relationships between *all willing partners* in crime prevention (NGOs, faith-based organisations, business, government departments, etc). This is especially applicable to the relationship between community-based structures and departments of government including SAPS.

At some sites, CMPs focused first on partnering with service providers (e.g., Phuthanang) before working with the community but it does not make sense to start with departmental delivery strategies and then negotiate with the community because there might be gaps and problems with service delivery (i.e., this can be a factor producing the high crime levels) and the strategies themselves. Instead, the evidence suggests that a CMP should *start* at community level by identifying the problems (the community understands these best) and then *afterwards* negotiate with the appropriate service providers on strategies to target these problems. This might mean making use of both community meetings and community needs assessments to define what the CMP can do to meet local needs.

2.14 Should there be different models for rural, peri-urban and urban areas?

This question was critically examined throughout the research process. The data from South Africa suggests that each site has its own strategic considerations, dynamics and available partnerships such that no one model should be applied. For instance, good cooperation between the Provincial Liquor Board and the CMP in Ngangelizwe enabled an intervention with tavern owners that reduced crime levels. In Windsor, cooperation with the Liquor Board was difficult but not with Metro Licensing and therefore the CMP worked with the latter to shut down the notorious and illegal King's Pub, a site of much crime and bylaw infractions.

The above finding fits with the data provided by the Centre for Court Innovation, which monitors community prosecutions internationally:

What works in one setting might prove disastrous in another - and vice versa. As the singer Billy Bragg once declared, “You can borrow ideas, but you can’t borrow situations.”²¹

In both the baseline study and evaluation for the community prosecution project in South Africa each site was independently documented to furnish chapters on each one. This may prove to be of some value if both the national and international findings are any guideline. Each new site should probably start with a study that examines baseline conditions including partnerships and then develop strategies accordingly. Periodic evaluations can identify lessons as the practice matures.

Despite the need to consider each site independently, there are some distinctions between rural, peri-urban and urban areas that can help *guide* a CMP when selecting strategies for a site. Figure Two (on the next page below) is a comparative table that helps to illustrate some of the differences found between these different kinds of areas.

²¹ Center for Court Innovation, E-mail Newsletter, October 2007.

FIGURE TWO:
KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN URBAN, PERI-URBAN AND RURAL AREAS OF SOUTH AFRICA

	<i>URBAN</i>	<i>PERI-URBAN</i>	<i>RURAL</i>
<i>Partnerships</i>	It is relatively easy to bring the relevant stakeholders together to define the crime problems of a well-defined urban area.	It is relatively easy to define the target area for concentrated work but sometimes transport subsidies and meals are required to bring stakeholders together.	Distances create such a major problem for facilitating partnerships that provincial and national support may be required
<i>Office Location</i>	A CMP can locate in one easily accessible office	Many people will find it difficult to access the CMP at one office site	The CMP cannot have one office site—it is necessary to move between communities
<i>Targeting</i>	Crime concentrates in specific buildings, streets and places such that targeting these as a crime prevention strategy makes sense	Crime is widespread and often focuses on open areas and abandoned buildings but the owners cannot be easily located; settlement is often on private land	Buildings are seldom the focus of crime problems, which are often social fabric crimes and very widespread
<i>Community Court Access</i>	A community court can support and facilitate community prosecutions	A community court can help facilitate community prosecutions	A community court is not always applicable owing to the distances between people (access would be too limited)
<i>Taverns</i>	Illegal taverns in contravention of the bylaws are shut down	Shebeen regulation is seen as more practical here since these are new and developing environments and there are few alternative sources of recreation or business opportunities	Shebeens were not addressed here but drinking as a social problem is more often found on farms in many rural areas.
<i>Population</i>	Urban populations are often highly mixed	Often mixed but with pockets of settlement involving ethnicity	Often traditional groups requiring special skills and attention to custom

Figure Two continued on next page

FIGURE TWO (CONTINUED):

KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN URBAN, PERI-URBAN AND RURAL AREAS OF SOUTH AFRICA

	<i>URBAN</i>	<i>PERI-URBAN</i>	<i>RURAL</i>
<i>Making use of bylaws</i>	An urban CMP can concentrate on contravention of the bylaws	Some of these areas are outside of the regulatory framework for municipal areas	Some problems here concern stock theft and national legislation
<i>Forums</i>	The CMP can locate many types of partners from local to national in many different kinds of forums	The CMP can engage many types of partners from local to national in certain forums	Distances and bad roads make interdepartmental forums dysfunctional such that a rural CMP must concentrate on available partnerships for specific crime problems
<i>Municipal partnerships</i>	The municipality makes a good partner	The municipality can make a good partner but it is more difficult to cement this relationship	There is often conflict between the municipality and traditional forms of government

Since partnership building is a much bigger challenge at rural sites (owing to distances), it appeared to the evaluator that support from NPA seniors such as the DPP or the chief prosecutor within the NPA is more critical than at peri-urban or urban ones. This support is required to:

- Build partnerships at a national or provincial level to address ideas like one-stop-centres or rural outreach programmes
- Support the prosecutor in developing partnerships with Labour, Health, Social Development, Agriculture, Education and other groups found at national and provincial level
- Take decisions on the appropriate partnership activities and how to get these activities under way (partnerships might be organised around ideas like road shows or perhaps one-stop-centres.)

The debate around illegal taverns was an interesting one for exposing the difference between urban, peri-urban and rural areas. Many peri-urban areas are zones of new settlement (perhaps post-apartheid frontier lands) under a process of transition toward greater regulation. This cannot be an overnight process and as new and unregulated areas of settlement involve a different strategic approach. For instance:

- Closing down shebeens and illegal businesses will most likely drive them underground and/or lead to resentment and protest because these are survivalist businesses in an environment of very limited opportunity.
- Regulation and accessing services is also difficult owing to absentee-landlords
- Informal settlements are often on privately owned land (e.g., half of Bohlokong) requiring different approaches and strategies (e.g., encouraging municipal responsibility as in the case of Siyahlala where there was no refuse removal until CMP Cloete advocated this)
- Many social problems arise in peri-urban areas owing to weak service delivery (e.g., a lack of parks, development, social centres, and recreational facilities)

2.15 How should a CMP structure delivery and strategic partnerships?

Comparing the data from all sites, it seemed that every one of them evolved toward structuring activities and partnerships in these four ways:

- Participation in a local community based crime prevention group (preferably a pre-existing one like the CPF) to learn about community-level problems
- Working with a steering committee or strategic partners that can act upon the concerns of the community (the CMP can utilise one or more pre-existing bodies for this such as a Community Safety Forum or a SAPS-created crime combating group)
- Ensuring that the community has representation on the above steering committee (i.e., this provides an appropriate mechanism for reporting back to the community)
- Addressing the community more broadly through outreach (community outreach campaigns, event days, information campaigns, imbizos...)

The first, second and fourth components appeared in one form or another at seven out of nine sites (exceptions: Phuthanang was inactive *and* the rural CMP was unable to achieve regular stakeholder attendance for a steering committee). In other words, *most* CMPs worked with: (1) community-based structures to identify problems; (2) stakeholders at governmental level to help resolve the identified problems; and (3) the general public in terms of information campaigns. However, a critical factor for maximising success is the third factor: community involvement in generating solutions to problems through representation on more empowered bodies. Therefore this comes highly recommended (for details see Sections 3.6 on Siyahlala and 11.6 on Point).

It is seldom necessary for the NPA to create the components for delivery as described above. In fact, sustainability and stakeholder buy-in appear much more likely if the CMP works with *existing* structures and empowers them appropriately. Basically, identifying and working with existing structures prevents a duplication of efforts and friction with groups like the CPF. Consider:

- *New* structures developed by SPP Sunil Prithipal at Point collapsed when he departed and owing to this problem, his replacement, CMP Val Melis, decided to work closely with the existing CPF and create *community-ownership* of the solutions to crime problems (the new approach was more sustainable *and* community attitudes toward the NPA improved).
- At *most* sites, there was initial conflict with the CPF because it was feared that the CMP was coming to take over the role of this group (e.g., see Mamelodi).
- The compromise solution to initial conflict between CMP and CPF structures at Mamelodi was to make a CPF person the chair of the CMP's committee but it seems on reflection that the CMP could have avoided any friction and started out his body as a sub-forum of the CPF.
- Most CMPs reported (e.g., Durban, Windsor, Mdantsane, Kudumane) that it is better to work with the pre-existing community-based crime prevention groups rather than invent new ones.

While much impact in Siyahlala can be attributed to two integrated structures designed by the CMP Cloete to spearhead local crime prevention activities, these were created partly owing to the small size of the pilot site as explained in detail in that chapter (i.e., Siyahlala is a tiny area of Nyanga and crime prevention structures exist at a larger scale). Half the participants at this site and nearly all participants at six other sites found that targeting areas the size of one to two policing sectors or smaller: (1) prevented appropriate partnerships from forming; (2) led to crime displacement and (3) created a duplication of structures.

Even though a larger scale for delivery is being recommended, the new structures at Siyahlala (less than a policing sector) still corroborated the findings on how to structure partnerships. These more local structures involved: (a) a local committee of community representatives from the target site and (b) a steering committee that brings together the local representatives of departments such as municipal, provincial and national departments and civil society organisations that can deliver services; and (c) committees for delivering community information campaigns. Furthermore, these local structures created by the CMP were very effective and do not need to be dismantled. Instead this experience suggests that local *sub-forums* are very useful but should be affiliated structures and programmes found at a larger scale (CPFs, existing forums of service providers, public information campaigns).

2.16 Which local partnerships are most important for a CMP?

One chief lesson emerging from analysis is that a *community* prosecutor has two natural partners—the community and the police. Internationally, the community-based structure is usually accessed through police contacts.²² In South Africa, it was the same: SAPS contacts introduced the CMPs to the neighbourhood action groups or the community policing forums (CPFs). Thus, whether based on the local experience or the international one, *law enforcement partnerships* and community based crime prevention

²² Nugent, Elaine M. What does it mean to practice community prosecution? American Prosecutors Research Institute, February 2004, p. 22.

groups (e.g., neighbourhood watches in the US) dominate in the initial phases of setting up community prosecutions.

The CMP can help to empower community-based forums on crime prevention and liaise between them and other stakeholders to ensure that: (1) the appropriate departments are delivering on community identified problems; and (2) the community is participating in and informed about crime prevention. This refers to empowering not only the CPF but any similar community-based crime combating institution (e.g., the Anti-Stock Theft Forum, the Windsor Action Group). Whatever it may be called, this community-based group is one arm of the two essential partnerships to be negotiated.

Of *equal* importance is a relationship with the appropriate SAPS stations. These were not only the core and willing partners at most sites but the essential ones because SAPS has:

- Information about the crime problems (e.g., hotspots) that greatly facilitates community prosecutions
- Many ongoing community programmes (e.g., community imbizos)
- Significant partners (e.g., CPFs, NICRO)
- Crime intelligence (e.g., crime analysis units)
- Structures for delivery (e.g. sector forums, crime prevention units)
- Devoted personnel available full time to preventing crime problems.

That a representative body from the community and SAPS are the two most important partners (at this incipient stage) was illustrated by the rural site. This is all CMP Matolong had to work with at Kudumane (just these two main partners) and accomplished much. In other words, he basically worked with the community's own CPF-type structure (Kgomo Modimo Wa Gae) and the SAPS Anti-stock Theft Unit (provincial) and he was effective in reducing the problem of cattle rustling with just these limited but *essential* partners.

Internationally, the establishment of community prosecutions is not a static event but evolves over time. As the model matures (especially by the third year), there is more engagement with a wider range of partners that can fully address *prevention* but most sites started out in the first year pattern as expected. For instance, Windsor had a strong focus on operations with SAPS, Immigration and other law enforcement departments. Promoting operations on illegal immigrants, drug sellers and illegal taverns can and did help to reduce the crime but has its limitations:

- Many illegal immigrants do not leave the country but when under pressure move to new areas
- Drug sellers adopt new and better methods (cell phone orders and car deliveries took over)
- The customers of closed-down taverns moved to other areas outside the project site like Sunrise Pub, which at the time of the evaluation study was doing a booming business until the early hours of the morning with drug sales taking place in the parking lot

Internationally, the described pattern (above) starts to change by the third year as more long-term social crime prevention partners come aboard (e.g., the Social Cluster to help prevent youth from ever turning to crime). Of course, this is also important because it is the social cluster that can help the most with longer-term crime prevention measures. The focus on operations needs to be balanced as soon as feasible with: (1) more social crime prevention efforts that have long-term impact (e.g., programmes for at-risk youth); and (2) identifying ways to prevent crime but encouraging delivery by the appropriate government departments.

Nonetheless *starting* with the law enforcement cluster is most strategic at the incipient stage since it immediately enrolls a CMP into crime prevention activities, offers some immediate deliverables, and starts the CMP on the road to developing partnerships for longer term impact (this was underway at most sites).

There is no doubt that a wide spectrum of partners from many different departments and organisations has many advantages over limited partnerships. Consider:

- At Mdantsane, the CMP's programmes became much less effective when the SAPS station commissioner was transferred and replaced by a less enthusiastic partner.
- At Mamelodi, it contributed to a confusion of roles when the CMP, who is based at an office within a police station, became more associated with policing than a court (hence, the CPF leadership initially felt threatened).
- CMP Mncwabe also became very close to one partner, Councillor S. Mthethwa at Mamelodi, who was later charged with corruption.

Despite the above findings, one cannot rush the process of partnership building and there seem to be 'growing pains'. Based on the international literature, the model of community prosecutions matures over a period of about six years to attract new and different kinds of partners.²³

Listed below are some of the partnerships that were in various stages of development at the eight active sites with general observations on how these partnerships were evolving or maturing during the pilot period and some lessons involved:

- Local Government: A basic stakeholder in National Crime Prevention Strategy and very helpful and well resourced once they agree to partner (see the chapter on Bohlakong as to how to deal with this effectively)
- Municipal Councillors: Can be excellent partners but one must take care to work equitably with groups of them and to avoid affiliating the CMP with a political party
- Social Development: Slow to come on board at nearly all sites except Bohlakong but a critical department for dealing with problem youth, victims of crime (especially women and children), and training for alternative sources of income (gang members, vagrants, prostitutes, etc)

²³ This 'community prosecution continuum' of some six years from infancy to maturity is well described in: Nugent, M. Elaine, *What does it mean to practice community prosecution?* American Prosecutors Research Institute, February 2004.

- Correctional Services: A good source of prison labour for addressing crime factors in the environment (under negotiation in Mamelodi); helpful with reintegration of ex-prisoners
- Education: A critical partner for long-term crime prevention programmes (and appropriate to taking the lead on crime prevention in the school curricula)
- Provincial Departments of Community Safety or Safety and Liaison: These departments have various names in different provinces but work specifically on crime prevention activities like supporting neighbourhood watches, 'Youth Against Crime' or creating Community Safety Coordinators.
- Department of Health: Slow to come on board but critical for addressing various health problems contributing to the cycle of violence (poor sanitation, malnutrition, HIV-Aids, and other diseases)
- Parks and Recreation: This group appears critical for addressing crime prevention problems (often found in peri-urban areas) such as open areas, overgrown fields and the lack of recreational facilities
- Representatives of the Business Sector (e.g. Chamber of Commerce, Business Against Crime, Farmers Associations, etc): Often willing partners that can help with financial support for crime prevention projects if approached appropriately (see the Chapter on Point or Mdantsane)
- Liquor Boards: Missing or uncooperative at some sites but when cooperative (see Ngangelizwe) these provincial bodies can make such good partners that the NPA might be encouraged to work with them to develop a comprehensive strategy to address the shebeen problem
- Liquor Trader Associations (Tavern Owner Forums): An excellent way of encouraging compliance because they can help monitor and regulate their members (the CMP does merely advise them of the law)
- Licensing Authorities: Helpful (especially in the urban areas) in regulating businesses and closing down unlicensed ones
- Metro Police: Potentially great partners owing to their responsibility to enforce the bylaws but they were surprisingly ineffective at most sites
- Justice: A critical partner for the community courts but this must be negotiated and developed from national level (courts facilitate improved community prosecutions but are not critical for delivery)

- Housing and Local Government: Not easy to bring on board but this group offers community development workers who can help in terms of crime prevention; significant also in terms of illegal immigration
- NGOs and Civil Society Organisations: These were major and important partners at most sites (e.g., NICRO can help on issues of domestic violence and diversions; Masimanyane Women's Support Centre in the Eastern Cape helped with the community imbizos; Men for Change helps with responsible drinking; SANCO has street committees)
- Sporting organisations: Sports councils and sporting groups can help to organise youth events (see the chapter on Mdantsane)
- Faith Based Organisations: Many of these have it one their agenda to fight poverty, domestic violence, drug abuse and other problems of concern to crime prevention
- Immigration/Home Affairs: Critical for the urban and peri-urban areas that have problems of illegal immigration (when illegal residents lack employment, they can turn to crime)
- Labour: A good partner in terms of training, alternative employment and addressing illegal immigration
- Department of the Environment: Particularly effective in Windsor but could be considered at other sites to address noise regulations and street cleaning
- Estate Agents: Helpful with regard to regulating rentals and sales so as to deal with the problem of illegal immigration (see the chapter on Windsor)

2.17 How are CMPs perceived by other NPA members and colleagues?

All CMPs had some concerns about how they were perceived by their colleagues but wherever there was strong support by a chief prosecutor or director, this perception was less. For example:

- The chief prosecutors were so supportive in Bethlehem, Point and Randburg that other prosecutors were asking about how they can play a part in community prosecutions!
- Chief Prosecutor Sello Matlhoko (Free State) championed community prosecutions by ensuring that the CMP educated other prosecutors in the cluster about the effort and then asked all prosecutors to undertake some form of

community prosecutions and present the results at the cluster management meetings. According to CMP Motaung, the other prosecutors changed from sceptics to enthusiastic supporters.

There was little time made available for piloting at the sites where directors and/or chiefs did not appear to support the project as strongly. In these cases, it was reported by the CMPs that many regular prosecutors then did not understand the role and some even criticised it as ‘social work’ (e.g., see Chapter 6 on Ngangelizwe and Chapter 7 on Phuthanang).

2.18 What are the basic material resources that a CMP needs to be effective?

Chapter 12 includes the general findings on resources including the rationale and explanation for these. However, in short bulleted form, these are the resource requirements:

- A car allowance (most CMPs prefer this to a car)
- An office (preferably affiliated with a community court or a SAPS station)
- Convenient access to a boardroom or meeting place
- A budget for refreshments and transporting members to meeting (vital for attendance at CMP meetings and especially in peri-urban and rural area)
- Flipchart paper and stand
- A digital camera, slide projector and screen
- A laptop with printer, and internet access (3G card)
- A landline telephone with an answering machine
- Professional stationary and cards to identify the CMP

2.19 What kind of training is required for a CMP?

Chapter 12 includes the general findings on training requirements including the rationale and explanation for these. However, in short bulleted form, the training requirements are these:

- A. Project Management Skills
- B. Conflict Management Skills
- C. Leadership skills
- D. Public Speaking Skills
- E. Financial Management
- F. Monitoring and Evaluation
- G. Computer Skills (standard programmes)

In addition to the above, all nine CMPs stated that:

- EXCHANGE VISITS to other CMP areas are critically important ways to learn about the role. Most CMPs expressed this in a similar manner: “Sharing experience is how we learn best.”
- ONGOING TRAINING is the best way to view the process rather than ‘preparation for a role.’

This seems to mean that engaging too many classroom settings is not as practical as developing an exchange programme where activities pertaining to community prosecutions can be observed (both nationally and internationally).

2.20 How should the model be institutionalised?

This is the subject of Chapter 13 where evidence emanating from the report is used to recommend that:

- A new name be given to community prosecutions to fit South African circumstances
- Management of the role fall to each DPP and be part of their performance contract
- A champion be located to drive the process of integrating community prosecutions into the NPA and to develop partnerships from national level to local level during the first three years at minimum (see next three bulleted items too)

- The strategy be properly introduced into the NPA with well-attended events explaining the findings of the report and the plans for implementation
- Partnership building be initiated between SAPS and the NPA at national level since this is the key partnership required
- Community prosecutions be marketed to all other stakeholders in the NCPS and discussed with them before finalising the implementation strategy
- Delivery continue at or expand from the existing pilot sites (or trust in the NPA will be lost)
- Criteria be developed for appointing new community prosecutors
- Two additional prosecutors be appointed per pilot site to ensure that the capacity-building is sustained within the organisation
- New performance agreements be negotiated that are more fitting to the role than standard ones used for ordinary prosecutors
- A quarterly reporting system be designed that is narrative to allow for better explanation of CMP activities and outcomes
- Training programmes be designed that fit the recommendations given in Chapter 12
- The CMP programme be publicly launched *at each site*
- The evaluation process continues over a three to five year period so that learning is documented, monitored and enters into implementation strategy—community prosecutions has evolved over time in every country
- Workshop events be designed and entered into budgets so that CMPs can share information on their sites at least once a year with each other and the NPA